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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
holder shall not pass until some future time, it is to be construed as an executory
contract of purchase and sale.
Can the employe in the instant case be called a stockholder where it does not
appear that he has been in a position to exercise any of the, privileges of a stock-
holder? Here the agent to whom the board of directors authorized the issuance
of shares which were to be ultimately transferred to the empleye does not ap-
pear to have been treated as the agent of the employe but rather as the agent of
the corporation. Exercise of corporate privileges by the agent could no the con-
strued as the act of this employe. It is a universally accepted proposition that
when stockholders are indebted to a corporation on account of their stock and
the corporation becomes insolvent, they may be compelled to pay the amount due
for the benefit of its creditors insofar as such judgment may be necessary to
satisfy their claims. See, Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, (1933), Perm. Ed.,
§§ 6051-6059. But it does not seem in the instant case that the employe has re-
ceived any of the rights of a stockholder upon which might be predicated his lia-
bility to respond for unpaid stock subscriptions which might be called in by the
receiver for the benefit of creditors of the corporation. Also, it is at least open to
doubt that the agent of the corporation could still legally transfer the stock to the
"subscriber" where the corporation is insolvent. That is to say, the corporation
is no longer in a position to perform. See in this regard Stern v. Mayer, supra.
In view of these considerations a decision of the Court declaring that the
employe-purchaser had assumed the status of a stockholder appears somewhat
arbitrary.
CLIFFORD A. RANDALL.
CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE-COmMON LAW LImITAION ABOLISHED.-The de-
ceased was shot in July, 1928, and died July, 1932. The defendant was subse-
quently indicted and found guilty of murder in the first degree. The defense
was that an indictment for murder will not lie when the death occurs more than
a year and a day after the assault. On appeal from the conviction, Held, affirmed.
The common law limitation that death must follow within a year and a day of
the wound is not effective in New York. People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191
N.E. 850 (1934).
At common law the death must have occurred within a year and a day after
the infliction of the fatal injury. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, (12th Ed. 1932),
sec. 437. If the death happened after that time it was conclusively presumed that
it occurred from some other cause. State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139, 17 Am. Dec. 563
(1826). The common law requirement has been adopted in some states and dis-
regarded in others but the numerical weight of authority clearly follows the com-
mon law rule. Note, 20 A.L.R. 1006. In Indiana the court reasons that the legis-
lature, by its silence on the subject of time between the inflicting of the wound
and the death, intended that the common law rule should govern. State v. Dailey,
et al., 191 Ind. 678, 134 N.E. 481, 20 A.L.R. 1004 (1922). Some states have in-
corporated the common law rule into the statutes. Montana is one of these. Rev.
Code of Mont., (1921) sec. 10961.
In the instant case the court goes back to the intention of the commissioners
who revised the Penal Code (Consol. Laws, c. 40) for a basis on which to make
its holding. The commissioners, in a preliminary note, expressed the desire to
render each definition complete in itself and mentioned the uncertainties which
result from following the definitions and conflicting authorities of the common
law. People v. Brengard, 191 N.E. 850, 852. The court, relying on this language
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of the commissioners, held that it would be "plain defiance" of the Penal Code
to inject the common law limitation as to time. Section 241 of the Penal Code of
New York is essentially like Section 340.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1933);
neither prescribes any limiting period of time between the inflicting of the fatal
wound and the resulting death.
A situation similar to the instant case has never been presented to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. It is submitted that Wisconsin may follow the
New York ruling. The common law rule was a safeguard in the past which is
no longer necessary. The certainty with which modem medical science can trace
the efficient cause of the death removes the reason for the common law rule.
HUGH V. GwiN.
LABOR UNIONS-WISCONSIN LABOR CODE-EMPLOYER RESTRAINED FROM INTER-
FERING WITH UNIONIZATION AcTIviTis.-Plaintiff, a Wisconsin labor union, al-
leging that several hundred of its members are employees of the defendant
company and that it is actively engaged in an attempt to procure additional mem-
bers among the employees of the defendant, sought to restrain the defendant
from further interfering with the exercise of asserted rights of its employees.
The alleged rights were: full freedom of association, self-organization, and the
designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of their employment free from the interference, restraint or coercion
of the employer or its agents, in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Wis. Stats. (1933) § 268.18. The
alleged interference was that the defendant refused to deal with the outside
representative of the union, informed its employees that it would not recognize
the union or deal with outside parties and threatened a shut-down if the em-
ployees persisted in their union demands. The National Industrial Recovery Act,
48 Stat. 198 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. 707 (a) (famed section 7a), the President's
Reemployment Agreement and the Wisconsin Statutes, Wis. Stats. (1933) §
133.07 (1) and § 268.18 et. seq. (Wisconsin Labor Code) were alleged to have
been violated. The lower court overruled a demurrer and after a hearing granted
a temporary injunction, basing its decision on the N.I.R.A. and P.R.A. (1934)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 270. On Appeal. Held, that the complaint states a cause of action
under the Wisconsin Statutes, Wis. Stats. (1933) § 133.07 and § 268.18, and the
findings are sufficient under the Wisconsin Labor Code, Wis. Stats. (1933) §
268.19 et seq. to sustain the injunction. Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation
of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., (Wis., 1934) 256 N.W. 56.
The court stated that Section 268.18, Wis. Stat., supra was a deliberate dec-
laration of labor's rights. It compared this section with the Norris-La Guardia
Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 102, and found them to be strikingly similar.
The Norris-La Guardia Act, however, does not attempt to broaden, limit or
define the rights of either employer or employee. Its sole purpose seems to be to
regulate, define and limit the power of Federal Courts in labor disputes. See,
Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164, 166 (E.D.
Mich., 1934). In cases involving the Norris-LaGuardia Act, either Section 7.
of N.I.R.A., supra, or the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A.
152 (3), have been relied upon as defining labor's rights. Myers et al. v. Lodisi-
ana & A. Ry. Co., 7 F. Supp. 92 (W.D. Louisiana, 1933) (invoking Railway
Labor Act) ; International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators Local v. Rex Theatre Corp., (C.C.A. 7th. Oct. 24,
